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part of the examination procedure."
Notwithstanding the court's failure to insure against the possibility of
jury misinterpretation of cautionary instructions, the Gibson decision pro-
vides an effective procedural safeguard against self-incrimination. s The
bar against admission of incriminating statements made by a defendant
at a compulsory psychiatric examination on the issue of guilt preserves the
psychiatric examination as a useful device in determining the defendant's




In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'
the Fourth Circuit examined the disclosure provision of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.2 At issue was the construction of section 186 of the Act which
prohibits "materially false statements" in applications for licenses to con-
struct nuclear facilities.3 Section 1861 does not state whether scienter must
be demonstrated as a basis for license revocation, pursuant to a false
statement made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
f See, e.g., LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 2, at 311; Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a
Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CAL. L. REv. 805 (1961).
m The Fourth Circuit decision in Gibson is consistent with its previous position on the
applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to compulsory psychiatric examina-
tions. See United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); note 50 supra.
1 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976).
571 F.2d at 1290-91.
42 U.S.C. § 2236 (1976) provides in relevant part:
(a) Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application
or any statement of fact required under section 2232 of this title, or because of
conditions revealed by such application or statement of fact or any report, record,
or inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to
grant a license on an original application, or for failure to construct or operate a
facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license or the
technical specifications in the application, or for violation of, or failure to observe
any of the terms and provisions of this chapter or of any regulation of the commis-
sion.
While absent in section 186, scienter is specifically mentioned in other sections of the
Act which define offenses. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2272 (1976) ("willfully violates"); 42 U.S.C.
2274-2276 (1976) ("intent to injure"); 42 U.S.C. § 2277 (1976) ("knowing or having reason to
believe").
1 571 F.2d at 1290-91. When VEPCO v. NRC commenced, the regulatory functions now
administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were performed by the Atomic Energy
Commission. The Energy Reorganization Act divided the Atomic Energy Commission into
two parts. Research and development activities were transferred to the Energy Research and
Development Administration, and the licensing and regulatory functions were delegated to
the newly created NRC. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (1976). The transfer of regulatory authority
did not affect this controversy.
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The parties stipulated that Virginia Electric and Power Co. (VEPCO)
believed the statements prepared in connection with its license applica-
tions were true when made, and none of the parties contended that VEPCO
attempted to deceive the NRC.6 The issues before the Fourth Circuit were
whether false information furnished by VEPCO pursuant to its licensing
application was "material," whether an omission can constitute a materi-
ally false statement, and whether scienter is necessary.7 The court found
that substantial evidence supported the NRC's determination that seven
false statements by VEPCO were "material" within the meaning of section
186.1 The Court also reasoned that VEPCO's omission of certain geologic
information from its reports to the NRC constituted material false state-
ments.9 Furthermore, an intent to deceive was unnecessary to incur liabil-
ity under section 186.10
The false statements were made in the course of licensing proceedings
between VEPCO and the NRC."1 Pursuant to an application filed in 1969,
the NRC issued permits to VEPCO for construction at the North Anna site
in Louisa County, Virginia. 2 VEPCO contractors commenced excavations
for the reactor in 1970. Shortly thereafter contractors discovered a chlorite
seam, a feature frequently associated with faulting in the Piedmont geo-
'See note 45 infra.
T 571 F.2d at 1291. The issuance of a permit or license for construction and operation of
a nuclear power plant is a two-step process. Applications for both the construction permit
and the operating license must contain extensive technical data evaluating the design of the
plant, the proposed plant site, and compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, the
applicant must discuss the anticipated environmental impact of the plant construction. The
application then must undergo a technical analysis by members of the NRC staff before a
license is issued. Safety aspects of a nuclear power plant license application also are reviewed
by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a panel of technical experts outside of
the NRC which independently assess possible safety hazards associated with construction
and operation of the proposed plant. Finally, a formal adjudicatory hearing is held pursuant
to section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976). Hearings on
applications for a construction permit are conducted before a three-member Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board. Decisions of the Board are subject to review by an Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board or by members of the NRC. As a general rule, all technical issues
are resolved by the Licensing Board, which determines whether a requested constuction
permit will be issued. See generally Mitchell, The Participation of Private Interest Represent-
atives in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Proceedings, 13 IDAHo L. REv. 309, 310-18 (1977);
see also Grainey, Nuclear Reactor Regulation: Practice and Procedure Before the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 11 GONZ. L. Rav. 809 (1976); Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful
Atom: Participation in AEC Regulatory Proceedings, 52 TEx. L. REV. 466, 481-89 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Jacks]. For a criticism of judicial acquiescence in NRC determinations,
see Yellin, Judicial Review and Nuclear Power: Assessing the Risks of Environmental
Catastrophe, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 969, 976 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Yellin].
571 F.2d at 1291; see text accompanying notes 22-26 infra.
511 F.2d at 1291. See also Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 4 NRCI 480, 484 (1976). VEPCO
v. NRC was the first case in which a licensee was charged with violating section 186 by making
material false statements pursuant to a license application for a nuclear facility.
" 571 F.2d at 1291.
"Id. at 1290-91.
12 Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 3 NRCI 347, 351 (1976). See also Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. for Constr. Permits for North Anna Power Station Units No. 1 and 2, 4 AEC 544 (1971).
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logic region. 3 Between 1970 and 1973, several geologists informed
VEPCO's employees and contractors that the chlorite seam might be in-
dicative of faulting." VEPCO, however, did not notify the Commission of
conflicting views among geologists concerning the significance of the
seam. Furthermore, applications for construction permits, filed in 1971,1
and for operating licenses, filed in 1973, also failed to disclose either the
existence of a chlorite seam in the area or disagreements among experts
about the seam's significance. Instead, the applications contained state-
ments implying that no fault was suspected. 8
In May 1973, VEPCO acknowledged to the Commission that the chlor-
ite seam indicated a fault. 9 In October, the NRC's Director of Regulation
issued an order to show cause why construction at the North Anna site
should not be interrupted pending further investigation.0 Specifically, the
Is Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 2 NRCI 498, 520-21 (1975). The chlorite seam was first
observed in February 1970 by a geotechnical engineer employed by VEPCO's general contrac-
tor for construction of the North Anna facility. Several days later, the chlorite seam also was
noted by a visiting geology professor, who reported his observations to a VEPCO utility
engineer working at the site. Id. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rejected VEPCO's
argument that it was not liable for its agents' or its independent contractors' failure to inform
it of material information. Id. at 504-05. The Board noted that the licensee is subject to
nondelegable duties under the Act, including full disclosure of features affecting site design.
Id. See also 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(1) (1978). Furthermore, the knowledge gained by agents in
the scope of their employment is attributable to the principal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 2 & 4 (1957). See generally Willard, A Geologic Fault Bedevils Reactor, Wash-
ington Post, Sept. 27, 1973, at G-1, col. 3.
11 2 NRCI at 521-32.
I d.
3 NRCI at 351.
Stipulations of Fact 39, 44, 96, 97; Joint Appendix 24, 26, 52-53.
Stipulations of Fact 109; Joint Appendix 57-58.
2 NRCI at 528-29. VEPCO's acknowledgement followed the conclusion of public hear-
ings conducted by the NRC in May 1973 concerning construction permits. VEPCO made no
reference to faulting or suspected faulting at the North Anna site during the hearings and
applications for permits and reasserted that no faulting was suspected. See id. at 533-34.
20 Id. at 501. The parties before the NRC agreed to divide the inquiry into two parts,
consisting of an examination of the geologic safety issue and a determination of whether
VEPCO had made "material false statements" to the NRC in violation of section 186. 571
F.2d at 1291. In the first inquiry, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board determined that
the North Anna site was suitable for construction of nuclear reactors, that the presence of a
fault did not prohibit approval of the construction permits, and that the power plant could
be built and operated without creating an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
The decision was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See North Anna
Environmental Coalition v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 533 F.2d 655, 656 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The court concluded that the fault was not "capable" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R.
§ 100, App. A, Im(c) (1978), and therefore was not likely to cause an earthquake. Id. at 661.
The court rejected the North Anna Environmental Coalition argument that all of the charac-
teristics of a capable fault must be disproved before a site satisfies the construction regulation
requirements. Id. at 662. Instead, the court adopted a reasonable assurance test and con-
cluded that the lack of movement in the fault area over a long period of time coupled with
continued surveillance by geologists satisfied the needs of safety and of power generation. Id.
at 665. But see Yellin, supra note 7, at 976. See generally Comment, The Energy Crisis:
Reasonable Assurances of Safety in the Regulation of Nuclear Power Facilities, 55 U. Det. J.
Urb. L. 371, 399-400 (1978).
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NRC sought to determine whether VEPCO had made "material false
statements" to the NRC in violation of section 186.1 During subsequent
agency proceedings, VEPCO argued that the NRC had misconstrued sec-
tion 186 of the Act.22 VEPCO contended that materiality includes an
element of reliance and the NRC had not dem6nstrated that it had relied
upon VEPCO's allegedly false statements in issuing licenses for construc-
tion .? The Fourth Circuit, however, affirmed without comment the NRC's
holding that materiality should be judged by whether a reasonable NRC
staff member would consider the information material in performing his
duties.24 The NRC adopted the generally recognized test that a material
statement is a statement which has a natural tendency to influence or is
capable of influencing a decision-maker in the exercise of his governmental
functions.2 Materiality does not incorporate an element of reliance.28
According to the NRC, materiality will vary depending upon the stage
of the licensing process.Y The applicant is allowed greater latitude in the
initial phases of the investigation to inquire into areas which may ulti-
mately have little significance in the licensing decision.Y At the hearing
21 571 F.2d at 1290-91. See also 2 NRCI at 503.
2 571 F.2d at 1290. Earlier decisions within the agency are reported at 4 NRCI 480 (1976)
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 3 NRCI 347 (1976) (Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board); 2 NRCI 498 (1975) (Atomic Safety and Licensing Board).
" 4 NRCI at 487. But cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54
(1972) (reliance held not a prerequisite to recovery pursuant to a violation of SEC Rule 10b-
5 for failure to disclose material facts).
21 571 F.2d at 1291; 4 NRCI at 486, 489. The materiality of the information is not based
upon whether a particular piece of information is specifically required by a statute. Id.
Furthermore, the NRC rejected the North Anna Coalition argument that materiality should
be judged in terms of what a layman, rather than an expert, would consider important. The
NRC reasoned that by virtue of the complexity of the pertinent data, such a definition of
materiality was untenable. Id. at 487.
25See United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Krause, 507 F.2d 113, 119 (5th Cir. 1975); Tzantarmas v. United States, 402 F.2d 163, 168
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1968); Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246 (8th
Cir. 1963); Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 878 (1961); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
4 NRCI at 487. The standard for materiality in a stockholder's derivative suit under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1976), for example, is whether
undisclosed facts or facts which were disclosed in a misleading manner would have assumed
actual significance in deliberations of reasonable and disinterested directors or which would
have created a substantial likelihood that such directors would have considered the "total
mix" of information "significantly altered." See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1977); cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976) (an objective standard of materiality is used in proxy statements, based upon
the significance of omitted or misrepresented facts to a reasonable investor); SEC v. Ameri-
can Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1170 (E.D. Va. 1977) (the basic test for materiality is
whether a reasonable and prudent investor would attach importance to the facts misrepre-
sented or omitted). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
" 4 NRCI at 487.
21 Id. For a similar analysis of materiality under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978),
see Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule 10b-5?, 42 FoRDHAk L.
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stage of the proceedings, however, when agency decision-making is immi-
nent, all potentially relevant data must be supplied promptly to the
NRC. 29
Acknowledging its failure to furnish information concerning the chlorite
seam to the NRC, VEPCO urged that omissions of material facts were not
"statements" within the meaning of section 186. 31 Both the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board3l and the NRC3 held that in view of the Act's direct
mandate with regard to public health and safety,3 an applicant is account-
able for omissions, as well as actual statements, of material facts which
are important to a review of health and safety issues.3 The Licensing
Board 5 and the NRC3 1 also reasoned that section 186 of the Atomic Energy
Act is analogous to section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343
7
insofar as section 18 does not expressly prohibit omissions but has been
construed for sound policy reasons, to reach omissions.3 Furthermore, the
NRC3 stressed the similarities between the monitoring function of the
REv. 243, 246-47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs]. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawul to employ
any device to defraud, deceive or manipulate in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. Jacobs notes that the same standards of materiality and deception are not applied
to all types of statements. Courts tolerate a lower standard of accuracy for misstatements or
partial omissions in shorter, less formal statements drafted under the exigencies of time
pressure. Thus proxy statements and registration statements are usually subject to much
stricter scrutiny than press releases or letters to stockholders issued during a proxy fight or
tender offer. Id.
2 4 NRCI at 487-88.
571 F.2d at 1291; 4 NRCI at 488.
3 2 NRCI at 508.
31 4 NRCI at 488.
" The 1954 Act specifically conditions the issuance of licenses for the construction or
operation of nuclear facilities upon an adequate provision for the health and safety of the
public. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(e)(7), 2099, 2133(b), 2134(a)-(d) (1976). Furthermore, the NRC is
charged with formulating rules and regulations to insure the public health and safety. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2012(d), (e), 2013(d), 2014(v), (cc), 2051(a)(5), (d), 2061(b), 2073(b), 2093(b),
2201(b), (i), 2232(a) (1976).
2 NRCI at 508; 4 NRCI at 489. But see Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 3 NRCI 346, 361-
62 (1976) ("statement" as used in section 186 connotes some affirmative representation and
an omission cannot be construed as a "statement"). The NRC agreed with the Licensing
Board and reinstated its holding that nondisclosures come within the meaning of section 186.
See 4 NRCI at 488-93.
" 2 NRCI at 507-08, citing Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 386 n. 19
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11 4 NRCI at 490.
37 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
" 4 NRCI at 490; cf. Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 386 n. 19
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (an omission of material information from a document pursuant to a securid
ties offering created a false and misleading statement just as surely as would the inclusion of
incorrect information); Pennsylvania Cent. Sec. Litigation, 357 F. Supp. 869, 876 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affl'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) (nondisclosure of material facts should be treated as
material false statements). See generally Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); A. BECHT & MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND
STIcr LIBILTY CASES, 21-43 (1961) (discussion of linguistic and legal problems arising in
cases involving omissions); Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 597-620 (1958).
1 4 NRCI at 490.
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Investment Advisors' Act of 1940,11 and the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts." All four acts place a premium upon full
disclosure of material information.2
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the question of intent and its rela-
tion to the full disclosure of material informatibn required in Section 186.
In affirming the NRC's holding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the
purpose of the Atomic Energy Act is to protect the public by requiring a
presentation of all pertinent information in a license application proceed-
ing. 3 The NRC reasoned an applicant who was liable only for statements
known to be false would be less likely to ensure that its agents were main-
taining the highest standards in their work." The less the applicant knew,
the less its liability. Thus to allow innocent mistakes would place a prem-
ium on ignorance." The Fourth Circuit accepted the NRC's argument that
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, 80b-3 (1976).
4' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(a), 78q(a), 78j(b), 78n(a), 78n(e), 78r(a) (1976).
42 4 NRCI at 490. The courts repeatedly have held that disclosure provisions designed to
protect the public interest, such as in the area of securities offerings, are to be liberally
construed in favor of full disclosure. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963), for example, the Supreme Court held that the Investment Advisors' Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 21 (1976), requires full and frank disclosure of investment practices in order
to insure equal access among investigators. The omission of a specific proscription against
nondisclosures did not restrict the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisors' Act. The
Supreme Court reasoned that a broad remedial construction of the statute must encompass
nondisclosures. Id.; cf. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976) (full
disclosure in proxy statements is intended not simply to insure that the transaction is fair,
but also to enable shareholders to make an informed choice); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (full disclosure of material information in connection with
the purchase of any security is to be construed flexibly in order to effectuate a high standard
of business ethic in the securities industry). See generally Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); see also Jacobs, supra
note 28, at 248-49 n.28.
3 571 F.2d at 1291. The hearing reports confirm that in passing the 1954 Act, the legisla-
tors were not concerned primarily with the culpability of the licensee. Proposed Amendments
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Hearing Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 113-14, 400-01 (1954). Paul W. McQuillen, Chairman of the Legal Com-
mittee, Dow Chemical-Detroit Edison and Associates Atomic Power Development Project,
stated that sections 186 and 187 empowered the Atomic Energy Commission to amend or
revoke licenses with virtually unlimited administrative discretion. Id. at 113-14. Similarly,
Oscar M. Ruebhauser, Chairman of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, argued that section 186 would enable the Commission
to revoke licenses "for reasons wholly beyond the control of the most diligent licensee." Id.
at 400-01. The Joint Committee apparently was unresponsive to arguments that license
revocation should be restricted to instance of willful or knowing false statements.
, 4 NRCI at 486.
Id. Although the parties stipulated that VEPCO did not intentionally deceive the
NRC, the chronology of facts suggests that VEPCO did in fact attempt to keep material
information from the NRC. Small sheer faults were observed as early as 1968, and the chlorite
seam was discovered in 1970. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra. Nevertheless,
VEPCO's consultants' reports and safety analysis reports repeatedly asserted that "the near-
est known fault is several miles from the site" and "faulting of rock at the site is neither
known nor is it suspected." 4 NRCI at 482-83. Perhaps the stipulation can be explained as a
piece of trial strategy on the part of the North Anna Environmental Coalition and the NRC,
1979]
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licensees must have every incentive to scrutinize their internal procedures
thus insuring that their submissions to the NRC are complete and accur-
ate. Accordingly, the court held that licensees were liable for any failure
to disclose material information to the NRC, regardless of their intent."
Although neither the Fourth Circuit nor the NRC characterized its hold-
ings as a strict liability decision, their focus on the purpose of the 1954 Act
results in a strict liability standard whereby neither scienter nor negligence
need be shown to create liability pursuant to section 186.11
To illustrate the focus on purpose and the resultant strict liability
standard, the NRC noted that other varieties of legislation directed toward
public well-being also have been interpreted to impose strict liability stan-
dards to insure compliance with federal regulations. " One of the most
who preferred to have the controversy resolved in terms of a strict liability decision, rather
than on grounds of VEPCO's culpability. Certainly the Fourth Circuit's holding that scienter
need not be demonstrated pursuant to section 186 extends the application of the statute and
the authority of the NRC to pursue license violations far more than a similar ruling based
upon the licensee's guilty intent. To hold that scienter is required would necessitate litigation
of the intent issue in every licensing proceeding. The Fourth Circuit decision mandates that
scienter is no longer an issue.
"1 571 F.2d at 1290-92; 4 NRCI at 486. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (1976) states that "the
development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum
contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of making
the maximum contribution to the common defense and security." See X-Ray Eng'r Co., 1
AEC 553, 555 (1960). See generally Jacks, supra note 7, at 479; see also note 33 supra.
Overwhelming congressional concern with virtually flawless power plant construction and
design is evidenced by Congress' instruction to the NRC to conduct hearings at both the
construction permit and licensing stages. Congress often prescribes hearing procedures but
seldom directs when hearings must be conducted. Id.
11 Strict liability offenses tentatively may be characterized as offenses in which the sole
question is whether the defendant committed the act proscribed by the statute, regardless of
intent. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731, 733 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Wasserstrom]. Prosser notes that the strict liability statutes recognize
no excuse for the violation committed, and neither reasonable ignorance nor proper care will
avoid liability. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRs § 36 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although
he had exercised the utmost care to prevent such harm.
(2) Such strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the risk of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519 (Tent. Draft. No. 10, 1964).
11 4 NRCI at 486-87; cf. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 564-65 (1971) (improper transportation of acids); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,
607-10 (1971) (failure to register dangerous firearms); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 281 (1943) (distribution of adulterated and misbranded drugs); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1922) (unlawful sale of narcotics without a written order); United States
v. Chalaire, 316 F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (E.D. La. 1970) (unlawful sale of fireworks to children);
State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215 P. 41, 44-47 (1923) (bank officer borrowing funds in
excess of the statutory provision). See generally Blakely & Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribu-
tion of Stolen Property: The Need for Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1512, 1590-91 (1976);
O'Keefe, Criminal Liability: Park Update, 32 FOOD, DRUG, COSMErIc L.J. 392 (1977)




significant strict liability cases discussed by the NRC was United States
v. Park.9 In Park, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a retail
food chain president for his company's violations of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, despite his insistence that he was not personally
responsible for the violations. 0 The Court held that the defendant had the
duty and authority either to prevent or to correct the illegal actions.-'
Furthermore, the law imposed an affirmative duty to insure that violations
did not occur.52 The Supreme Court reasoned that imposing liability upon
food distributors and their agents who fail to investigate potential viola-
tions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, promotes the public's interest
in the purity of its food and thus effectuates the purpose of the statute. 3
The NRC stated that the public health consideration emphasized in Park
applies at least with equal force in the nuclear power area, where the
potential for catastrophe is considerable.
5 4
Legislation designed to protect the public health and safety may forego
conventional requirements of culpability.5 The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that individuals in an industrialized society are largely behind
self-protection. 6 In the interest of society's well-being, the law has placed
the burden of potential liability upon persons who stand in responsible
positions in relation to a public danger.5 7 In Virginia Electric & Power Co.
v. NRC, the court determined that utilities engaged in the construction
and operation of nuclear facilities are to be held strictly liable for any
failure to disclose material information to the NRC. The Fourth Circuit,
in its affirmation of the NRC's "stringent interpretation" of section 186,
clearly agreed with the NRC's analysis."
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the imposition of a $32,500 fine
against VEPCO. 0 The North Anna Coalition argued that the penalty was
so mild as to constitute an abuse of administrative discretion. The court,
however, determined that in view of VEPCO's lack of intent to deceive the
NRC, the fine was reasonable.2 Moreover, a commission's interpretation
"1 421 U.S. 658 (1975). See generally O'Keefe, supra note 48, at 392.
421 U.S. at 671; see 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1976).
1, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
52 Id.
3 Id. at 671.
11 4 NRCI at 487.
0 PROSSER, supra note 47, at § 36; Wasserstrom, supra note 47, at 733. See generally note
48 supra. For other decisions construing violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, see United States v. Cassaro, Inc., 443 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Alfred
M. Lewis, Inc., 431 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). See also O'Keefe,
& Isley, Dotterweich, Revisited-Criminal Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, 31 FooD, DRUG, Cosmgrc L.J. 69, 79 (1976).
5s United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). See also United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
" See note 47 supra.
4 NRCI at 491.
" 571 F.2d at 1291.
' Id. at 1291-92.
" Id. at 1290.
'n Id. at 1291-92.
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